This paper examines the frequency of financial analysts' forecast revisions based on their incentives to revise. It develops a model of the analyst's optimal revision frequency as a function of the costs of information gathering and the profits from selling the information to investors. Our analysis is conducted in two stages. In the first stage, a single-period, Kyle (1985) model is used to determine the profits generated by privately informed investors who trade on the analyst's forecast revision. The analyst is assumed to be compensated as a function of these profits. In the second stage, the analyst's optimal revision frequency to collect and sell private information is determined. We find that the analyst's optimal revision frequency is increasing in the variance of liquidity trading volume, the volatility of the underlying earnings process, and the earnings-response coefficient and decreasing in the total number of informed traders who invest in the firm and the cost of revision. These theoretical results are developed into empirical hypotheses that the number of analysts' forecast revisions between earnings announcements is positively associated with variability of the earnings process, average prior trading volume, and earnings response coefficients, and negatively associated with skewness of prior trading volume, after controlling for firm size and prior average daily stock price changes. These hypotheses are tested cross-sectionally and we find significant support each of the hypothesized relations. Additional robustness tests show that these associations hold even after controlling for average daily stock price movement. Even stronger results are obtained when a narrower measure of forecast revision frequency is used, which avoids forecasts that potentially arise from herding.
Financial analysts function as information intermediaries in the capital markets, in essence selling private information to speculative investors. 1 There are two related streams of prior theoretical research.
The first approaches the topic from the perspective of adverse selection issues. Kim and Verrecchia (1994) model certain kinds of market participants, such as financial analysts, as "information processors" who take the public information released at the time of an earnings announcement and engage in costly additional processing to obtain private information that can be traded on at a profit. McNichols and Trueman (1994) demonstrate that public disclosure that occurs at regular and expected intervals, such as earnings announcements, also stimulates private information acquisition. The second stream of theoretical literature examines the information environment around analysts and properties of analysts' forecasts. Abarbanell, Lanen, and Verrecchia (1995) model forecasts in relation to endogenously determined prices, volume, and private information acquisition. Barron, Kim, Lim, and Stevens (1998) demonstrate the relation between observable properties of analysts' forecasts, such as dispersion and error in the mean forecast, and the information environment constructs of consensus and uncertainty. Finally, Trueman (1994) examines the circumstances that lead to the phenomenon of analyst herding. Together, these streams of research provide a basis for understanding analysts' role as information intermediaries in the capital markets.
Prior empirical research has identified a number of regularities regarding analysts' revisions of their existing forecasts. First, the level of analysts' forecast revision activity exhibits substantial variation cross-sectionally and intertemporally, and some analysts revise their forecasts infrequently. Brown, Foster, and Noreen (1985) document that, on average, 77.2% of analysts' forecasts included in the I/B/E/S detail data are not revised from one month to the next. Ajinkya, Atiase, and Gift (1991) find no revision in the mean forecast in 20% of the firm-months in their sample. Imhoff and Lobo (1984) report that the number of forecast revisions varies both intertemporally and cross-sectionally in their sample. Barron and Stuerke (1998) observe a positive association between dispersion in analysts' forecasts and subsequent forecast revisions after controlling for the number of analysts following the firm, suggesting that revision activity is not fully explained by analyst following.
Financial analysts act as intermediaries in the transfer of financial information to investors, and as such, their forecasts provide insight about information production and dissemination activities that are part of a firm's information environment. 2 Because analysts act as information intermediaries for firms and investors, their forecast revision frequency helps explain the equilibrium of the supply of and demand for earnings predictions and assessments of firm value. Consequently, theory and evidence about the determinants of forecast revision frequency furthers our understanding of cross-sectional and intertemporal differences in (1) the availability of private information (i.e, predisclosure information), (2) the usefulness of firm-provided information (such as earnings announcements and management earnings forecasts), and (3) the demand for information beyond that provided by the firm.
Interest in the level of analyst forecast revision frequency arises from empirical evidence that revision activity exhibits substantial variation cross-sectionally, intertemporally, and relative to analyst following (Imhoff and Lobo 1984, Brown, Foster and Noreen 1985; Kang, O'Brien and Sivaramakrishnan, 1994) . In addition, interest in forecast revision frequency also stems from the accounting literature that investigates analyst following as a measure of informational supply (e.g., Bhushan 1989, Brennan and Hughes 1991) , as a measure of private information transferred to investors (Dempsey 1989 , Shores 1990 , or a measure of the informativeness of firms' disclosure policies (Lang and Lundholm 1996) . However, the total number of analysts following a given firm includes analysts who actively update forecasts after acquiring information, analysts who update forecasts after observing the forecasts of other analysts, and analysts who rarely update their forecasts. The inclusion of all three types of analysts (active, herding, and inactive, respectively) in a measure of the level of private information acquisition and dissemination assumes either (1) that both the proportions and activity levels of the analysts following a firm are the same for all firms and all time-periods, or (2) that firms' information environments are influenced similarly by the activities of all three types of analysts. Further, the total number of analysts following the firm includes both analysts who respond quickly to information released by the firm, and those who do not. Analyst forecast revision frequency better captures the underlying construct of information acquisition and dissemination.
In this study, the costs and benefits of preparing and disseminating forecast revisions are examined in a single-analyst, discrete-time model, in which the analyst chooses the number of forecast revisions during the period to maximize his net compensation. 3 Corresponding to real-world practice, 4 the analyst's compensation is modeled as a function of expected profit from sale of the forecast, net of the costs to gather and compile information. Within that framework, a multiple-investor extension of a one-period Kyle (1985) model is used to calculate the value of the information to the analyst, based on the expected profits the information can yield for informed investors. We derive the analyst's optimal number of revisions and analyze the comparative statics of this optimal strategy. We then develop empirical proxies for the variables in our model, and test the predictions of the model. The paper is organized as follows: Section I describes the setting. Section II derives the informed investor's expected profits from trading. Section III derives the analyst's optimal number of revisions.
Section IV analyzes the comparative statics. Section V develops the empirical hypotheses. Section VI describes data sources and variable measurements. Section VII present the empirical results. Section VIII concludes. All proofs are in the appendix.
I. The Setting
Consider a setting in which there are liquidity traders, one financial analyst, many investors who purchase information from the analyst, and market makers, all of whom are risk neutral. The economy has one risky asset, a security consisting of a risky firm, and a risk-free asset. Latent information is generated over time about the risky firm's current fiscal period earnings. On a known date, the risky firm announces the realized earnings for a given fiscal period. In the overall period between successive earnings announcements there are T discrete trading dates, which are indexed using the calendar dates 0, 1, 2, ,T t = K . So calendar date 0 t = corresponds to the prior earnings announcement, date 1 t = is the first trading date, date tT = is the last trading date, and date EA is the next earnings announcement (see Figure 1) . At a cost, the analyst can collect and process the latent information to revise his forecast of current period earnings. Then, the analyst can sell the revised forecast to investors for a profit. The analyst chooses the number of forecast revisions N to make during the overall period between earnings bonuses are not allocated evenly, but are based a complex system of subjective and objectives evaluations of each analyst by brokers, clients, and the underwriting side of the firm. We are assuming that analysts who generate recommendations that are more valuable for clients will receive higher evaluations from clients and brokers and thus they will receive higher bonuses.
announcements and chooses a specific set of revision dates 12 ,,..., N rrr from the list of calendar dates 1, 2, ,T K (see Figure 1 ). On each revision date, the analyst acquires and compiles information about the risky firm. He uses this information to forecast the end-of-period reported earnings, and sells his forecast to investors who become informed. The analyst seeks to maximize his own expected profit by choosing the optimal number of forecast revisions and choosing the optimal set of revision dates, in order to maximize expected trading profit for his client investors. 5 Since the change to earnings maps directly into the change to firm value, the analyst knows the expected profits from the sale of the information. For simplicity, we assume that the monopolist analyst has all of the bargaining power and thus his price for the information will equal the informed investors' expected profits. 6 This profit is determined by the market-clearing price set by market makers who observe only the net order flow and, thus, cannot distinguish informed trades from liquidity trades.
In the second stage, each informed investor uses the analyst's forecast to determine the quantity of shares in the risky asset that will maximize his expected profit from the trade. He knows that the market maker cannot distinguish an informed trade from a liquidity trade. Each informed investor places an order for his optimal quantity with the market maker, who observes the total order flow. The market maker determines the price at which the market clears, and trading takes place. At this point, the analyst's forecast is only partially reflected in the price of the risky asset. After the informed investor has earned his profits from the trade, the analyst publicly announces his forecast, 7 and market makers adjust the price of the asset to fully impound the newly announced information. The analyst's compensation is assumed to be a function of his profit from selling forecasts and revisions to informed investors and his costs to acquire and combine information into a forecast of earnings. 8 The analyst knows that the profit from selling his forecasts is determined by investors' ability to trade profitably on the information in the forecast.
Informed trading by investors who purchased the analyst's revised earnings forecast revision are modeled in section 1. At certain points in time, the analyst collects the new information since the last clients, and later released to the public. 8 Among the components of analyst compensation is bonus amounts that are allocated based on brokers', institutional investors', and individual investors' satisfaction with the analyst (Adair 1996) . Analyst compensation is not merely a function of the analyst's incentives to revise his forecast. For example, Adair (1996) models components of analyst compensation that impact the optimistic bias in analysts' forecasts. However, for simplicity, this model addresses only the components of analyst compensation that affect the analyst's decision to issue forecast revisions. earnings announcement or publicly announced forecast and compiles it to arrive at a new forecast of earnings. He sells this information to speculative investors who are willing to pay a price (higher commissions) to become informed. In a competitive equilibrium, the price of purchasing information is equal to the ex-ante expected profit from trading on the information. Each speculative investor chooses his optimal quantity of shares and makes a single trade on the information. Since each speculative investor receives the same information from the analyst, the optimal quantity of shares will be the same for each informed investor. Therefore, the analysis of the trading profit focuses on the decision of a single investor.
The market maker sets the trading price based upon the total order flow and the informed investor earns his profit. At this point, part of the new information is impounded in the price of the asset through this trade.
After the trade is complete, the analyst announces the revised forecast, and the price of the risky asset adjusts to fully impound the new information. The analyst uses the sum of the traders' expected profit in his selection of the optimal time between forecast revisions.
The first section of analysis describes and calculates an informed investor's expected profit from trading on information from the analyst, using the procedure developed by Kyle (1985) and extended by Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) and Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) . Then, using the ex-ante expected profit, the analyst's optimal frequency of forecast revision during the period is derived.
II. The Trading Equilibrium
Let the value of the security at the prior revision date 1 n r − is ( ) 1 np vrv − ≡. The sequence of events on the th n revision date is shown in Figure 2 . The analyst acquires information, revises his forecast, and sells the private information to M investors. The private information tells these informed investors that the value of the risky asset is ( ) n vrv ≡ and they submit an optimal market order to exploit this information.
For simplicity, we assume that the informed traders only have one trading opportunity to exploit their information. 9 After their trades are cleared, the private information is revealed and the next period price is 9 None of the qualitative results of the model would be changed if we relaxed this assumption and allowed the informed traders to exploit their information over two or more dates. updated. Let u be the number of shares traded by liquidity traders and assume u ~N(0, σ u 2 ). 10 Let z be the net order flow observed by the market makers. The informed investors conjecture that the market makers will set a market-clearing price p as a linear function of the net order flow
where µ and λ are constants. The th i informed investor maximizes his expected profits by choosing his
where x is his conjecture about the average quantity traded by other informed traders and the net order flow is
zxMxu =+−+ . Solving for the first order condition yields
Since all informed investors receive the same forecasts, the ith informed investor conjectures that all informed investors will optimally choose to trade the same number of shares, which implies that * xx = .
Substituting into the first order condition
  
, where
There are many market makers who are competitive. In equilibrium, they set the trading price to clear the market at
Evaluating the conditional expectation and matching the resulting expression to the conjectured form,
Then, the ex-ante expected profit by the M informed traders from trading over revision interval n t ∆ is
, where the constant
III. The Frequency of Analyst Revision
The analyst seeks to maximize his compensation over the period T by choosing the optimal number of forecast revisions * N and the optimal set of revision intervals 12 ,,, N ttt ∆∆∆ K
. In any period, the analyst can incur the cost of information collection and collect the cumulative information about the earnings realization. The analyst then forecasts earnings, which translate into changes in firm value. Since earnings changes are normally distributed, the change to earnings is given by 1 tt yyy − ∆=− , the volatility of earnings is 2 y t σ ∆ , and the volatility of earnings maps into the cumulative variance of firm value as 222 vy tRt σσ ∆=∆ , as described above.
For N forecast revisions, define the "roundup" and "rounddown" revision intervals as
For example, suppose the overall period between successive earnings announcements is 91 days ( ) 
=∆=∆=
The following lemma proves that for N forecast revisions, the analyst's optimal revision strategy is a combination of roundup and rounddown revision intervals, which spans all of the calendar dates from 0 to T . 
IV. Comparative Statics
Analyzing the comparative statics of the optimal strategy in Proposition 1 generates a number of empirical predictions about the analyst's optimal number of revisions. Proposition 2 makes a number of interesting empirical predictions about the determinants of the analyst's revision frequency. After controlling for other influences, the cross-section of analysts' revision frequency is predicted to be increasing in the standard deviation of liquidity trading, the standard deviation of firm value, and the earnings-response coefficient and decreasing in the number in of informed traders and the cost of forecast revision.
These relationships can be seen visually with the following graphs. For illustration purposes, we set 90 days,1,7,1,10,7 yu TRcM σσ ====== . Figure 3 shows the optimal number of revisions N * in a two-dimensional space with earnings volatility y σ on the x-axis and the cost of revision c on the y-axis.
There is a region where it is optimal to make 0 revisions, another region where it is optimal to make 1 revision, a third region where it is optimal to make 2 revisions, etc. The boundaries between these regions are a series of critical value lines. For example, the boundary between the 0 revision region and 1 revision is a solid line labeled c0. This line is all of the points in this two-dimensional space where the 
V. Hypothesis Development
The theory described above addresses the decision of a single analyst who actively acquires and disseminates information about future earnings through his forecasts. Many firms, however, are followed by more than one analyst who provide forecast revisions to investors with varying levels of frequency. The number of revisions by all analysts within the period is highly correlated with the number of analysts following the firm. Analyst following has been shown to be related to the speed with which information is impounded in stock price (e.g., Dempsey 1989 and Brennan, Jegadeesh, and Swaminathan 1993). 12 Further, other analysts' forecasts are a low-cost source of information for analysts and may also reflect analysts' opportunities for revising based on other analysts' forecasts. The dependent variable used to capture analyst frequency in this study is the number of revisions of forecasted annual earnings per share between earnings announcements, scaled by analyst following at the earnings announcement date.
Revisions by all analysts, however, may include revisions that arise from observing other analysts'
forecasts, so that scaling by analyst following may not fully control for herding. While these revisions represent one type of information acquisition and dissemination activity, it is not the type of activity addressed by the theory. To control for herding, additional tests are conducted based on the number of revisions by active analysts, defined as those analysts who respond quickly to earnings announcements.
The theory described above predicts that frequency of revisions is increasing in the volatility of the earnings process. One measure of the variability of earnings for a period is the residual from estimating a regression of the firm's earnings process (Barefield and Comisky 1975, 1979) . Hypothesis 1, stated in the alternate form is:
H1: The frequency of analysts' forecast revisions for a firm is positively associated with the variability of that firm's earnings process.
The theory predicts that the frequency of forecast revisions is increasing in the earnings response coefficients. Hypothesis 2, in the alternate form, is:
H2: The frequency of analysts' forecast revisions for a firm is positively associated with the firm's earnings response coefficient.
The theory predicts that the frequency of forecast revisions is increasing in the variance of the net order flow from liquidity trading. While liquidity trading cannot be directly observed, trading volume is readily observable. When average trading volume is high, the average number of liquidity shares traded is also expected to be high, and the level of average trading volume may disguise informed trades (Bhushan 1989 ). This leads to Hypothesis 3, stated in the alternate form:
H3: The frequency of analysts' forecast revisions for a firm is positively associated with the firm's prior average trading volume.
The model predicts that the analyst's frequency of forecast revisions is decreasing in the total number of informed investors following the risky firm. Bamber, Barron and Stober (1999) find that differential interpretations are associated with trading volume when trading volume is unusually high. On days when private information is generated, there should be relatively more shares traded. On days when no private information is generated, there should be few shares traded. The difference between information days and non-information day should generate skewness of daily trading volume. Hence, we employ the skewness of prior daily trading volume as a proxy for the number of informed investors. This leads to Hypothesis 4:
H4: The frequency of analysts' forecast revisions for a firm is negatively associated with prior skewness of trading volume.
In summary, the following relations are predicted: Frequency = f(ERC, volatility, average volume, skewness of volume). Stock price movement may occur because many informed trades have been placed and part or all of the information implicit in those trades has been inferred by all other market participants. In that case, daily stock price movement will capture the extent of informed trading, and will be positively correlated with the skewness of trading volume and negatively related to frequency of forecast revisions. In contrast, daily stock price movement may reflect the sensitivity of stock price to new information. If daily price movement captures price sensitivity to new information, it will be positively correlated with earnings response coefficients, and positively related to forecast revision frequency. In either case, omission of this variable from regression estimation would potentially bias coefficients of other variables in the estimation, and average daily stock price movement is therefore included as a control variable. (12) where CAR it is the cumulative abnormal return from day -1 to day +1 around the earnings announcement date, estimated using a market model, 14 UE it is unexpected earnings in the announcement (actual minus mean forecast), P i(t-2) is the closing stock price two days before the earnings announcement, γ 0 and γ 1 are firm-specific regression parameters, and ε it is the error term. 15 Unexpected earnings is measured as the difference between forecasted EPS and actual EPS from the I/B/E/S tape if actual EPS is reported on that tape, 16 and otherwise actual EPS is primary EPS before extraordinary items from the quarterly Compustat tapes. Forecasted EPS is the mean of new one-quarter-ahead forecasts reported by I/B/E/S in the most recent month prior to the earnings announcement date in which at least one new forecast is reported. 17 Average volume is calculated as the mean of the average daily shares traded, from the CRSP tapes, and is measured over the prior year, ending at day t-2, as
VI. Data Sources And Variable Measurement
where T equals the number of trading days where volume is available on the tapes. The natural logarithm of average daily volume (denoted LnVolume) is used in hypothesis tests to mitigate heteroskedasticity 14 The market model is estimated over trading days -200 to -2, where the announcement date is day 0, using the CRSP value-weighted index. 15 Firms with extreme values for γ 1 were investigated for influential observations and re-estimated after excluding highly influential observations. 16 Philbrick and Ricks (1991) point out the importance of using a measure of EPS that includes and excludes the same items as the forecasts. According to Christopher Rockaway of I/B/E/S International, analysts' forecasts and actual earnings on the I/B/E/S tape are stated on the same basis, and actual earnings are adjusted to reflect the items included in analysts forecasts (which are not necessarily the same as earnings per share before extraordinary items). Use of this EPS number reduces measurement error in unexpected earnings. The items included in net income that are often excluded from analysts' forecasts include non-operating items and the effect of one-time events. 17 Because this estimation of each firm's ERC is a noisy measure of firms' price responses to new information, any ERC that is not significantly different from zero is set to zero. The natural log of the ERC plus 0.0001 is used in hypothesis tests, and is denoted LnERC. Alternate tests were conducted using an indicator variable that was set equal to 1 if the firm-specific ERC was greater than 1.57 (above the median) and 0 otherwise. Results of those tests were similar to those presented in tables 3 and 4. However, the coefficient on the indicator variable was significantly positive at p < 0.01 for all quarters and both measures of the dependent variable, unlike results using LnERC. This may be due to the inherent noise of the estimated ERCs.
arising from skewness of the untransformed variable. Skewness of trading volume is also measured over the prior year, and is calculated as ( )
where σ is the standard deviation of Volume . 18 Firm size, also from the CRSP tapes, is the market value of equity two days before the earnings announcement for the quarter during which analyst activity is measured, and is also log-transformed (LnSize).
The average daily price movement is calculated by using the high and low stock prices for each day from the CRSP daily tapes for the prior fiscal year as ( ) all analysts (denoted Revisions) is computed by counting the number of revisions of one-year-ahead annual earnings forecasts on the I/B/E/S detail tape between the day after an earnings announcement and the day 18 The variable is divided by 10,000 for purposes of hypothesis tests. 19 Alternative tests were conducted using the absolute difference between actual quarterly EPS and forecasted quarterly EPS in the first month of the fiscal period as a measure of earnings predictability. The results were qualitatively similar to the results presented in tables 3 and 4, and lead to identical inferences. before the subsequent announcement. The dependent variable (denoted Frequency) is Revisions divided by Following. As an alternative, the number of forecast revisions during the quarter by active analysts (denoted Revisions2), is also used. It is computed by identifying the analysts who issue a revised forecast within 20 trading days after the earnings announcement, and counting the number of forecast revisions during the quarter by those analysts. 20 The alternative dependent variable (denoted Frequency2) is Revisions2 divided by Following. 21 Use of this alternative measure is intended to reduce the influence of herding analysts on the dependent variable. 
VII. Empirical Results

A. Description of Regression Models
Since the data includes multiple firm-quarter observations for firms, there is dependency in the data, and the standard errors for regression coefficients are biased upward. To mitigate this problem, indicator variables for years 1987-1995 are used in the regressions. 20 This variable is similar to that used in Barron and Stuerke (1998) . However, Barron and Stuerke focus on revisions of revisions after the announcement, and only count the second revision during the quarter. In the current study, Activity2 is the number of all revisions by analysts who issue a revision within the first 20 trading days of the quarter. 21 Alternate tests using Revisions and Revisions2 as the dependent variables and including Following as a control variable were also conducted. The results of those tests demonstrate a strong affect of analyst following on the number of forecast revisions. Beyond that, however, the results of those tests were qualitatively similar to the results presented in tables 3 and 4. 22 Tests for a difference of means were significant at α < 0.01 for all pairs of quarters.
The following regression model is used to test the hypotheses presented above: 
where the variables are measured as defined above. An alternative model including average daily stock price changes is also estimated: 
The coefficients β 1 , β 2 , and β 3 are all predicted to be positive. The coefficient β 4 is predicted to be negative. No predictions are made about sign or significance for β 0 for any year, β 5 , or β 6 , in part because of the effect of analyst following in the denominator of Frequency.
B. Univariate Evidence
Pearson pairwise correlations for the entire sample are presented in table 2. Examination of the correlation table indicates that several of the variables are highly correlated. LnVolume, LnSize and Following are all correlated at greater than 0.500, suggesting the presence of collinearity in the regressions.
The correlation between LnERC and the magnitude of Price Change is 0.066, the correlation between Skew(Vol) and Price Change is -0.154, and the magnitude of Price Change is positively correlated with both measures of Frequency, consistent with average daily price movement capturing stock price sensitivity to new information rather than the incidence of informed trading. The two measures of the dependent variable, Frequency and Frequency2, are correlated at 0.916. Further, all of the independent variables are significantly correlated with both measures of the dependent variable, in the predicted directions, except for LnERC, which is significantly correlated only with the measure of revisions by active analysts.
C. Results of Multivariate Tests
Results from the estimations of equations (17) and (18) using the number of revisions by active analysts scaled by analyst following as the dependent variable are presented in table 3. There are two advantages to the use of a measure based on active analyst over a measure based on all analysts. First, the theory assumes an analyst who actively acquires and disseminates information, so there is greater construct validity when the dependent variable is based on active analysts. Second, this measure of the dependent variable is less likely to include revisions that arise from herding. Revisions that arise from herding are likely to introduce noise, and possibly bias, into the measure of the dependent variable. Table 3 reports results when the dependent variable is revisions of active analysts, Frequency2.
Estimates of the coefficient on LnERC positive and significant at p < 0.01 in all quarters except the second quarter, providing support for the hypothesized relation between analyst revision frequency and ERCs. The dependent variables in Table 3 are statistically significant, but are they economically significant? This can be assessed by using the estimated regression equations in Table 3 to forecast (i.e., backcast) revision frequency by active analysts. For example, evaluating the first estimated regression in Table 3 at the means of the independent variables forecasts 0.348 revisions by active analysts in the first quarter of 1986. If the regression coefficient on LnVolume is set to zero, the forecasted ratio of revisions to active analysts drops to 0.172. This represents a -50.7% change, which is clearly economically significant.
Performing similar experiments on the other independent variables, LnVolatility, LnERC, and Skew(Volume), result in forecast changes of -3.5%, 0.5%, and 6.1% respectively. These changes are more humble, but still economically meaningful. Table 4 presents results from the estimations of equations (17) and (18) analysts who are herding, (2) the ERC is the appropriate measure of price sensitivity to new information only for earnings surprises, or (3) the estimated ERC is inherently noisy and the coefficient will therefore be biased toward zero. 25
VIII. Conclusion
This paper examines determinants of financial analysts' frequency of forecast revisions. We first present a model of analyst incentives to revise earnings forecasts, examining the analyst's decision to revise a forecast using the costs and benefits of producing a revision. We employ a single-period, Kyle (1985) model to calculate profit from trading as an input to the analyst's decision to revise his forecast. Using this structure, we present a model of financial analyst propensity to revise forecasts of earnings per share, in relation to the costs of information gathering and the profits from selling the information to investors. The results of this model indicate that an analyst's optimal number of forecast revisions during a period is increasing in the volatility of the earnings process, the earnings-response coefficient, and the variability of the net order flow of liquidity trading and decreasing in the cost of information acquisition and aggregation and is a decreasing function of the total number of informed investors following a firm, as long as there are at least two informed investors. Next, the analyst's likelihood of post-announcement revision is examined.
We find that the analyst's likelihood of revision following a public release of information is increasing in the earnings-response coefficient and permanent component of earnings innovations.
We then empirically test the predictions of the model and find results that are consistent with those predictions. Empirical tests provide evidence that revision frequency is associated positively with earnings variability, which proxies for the volatility of the underlying earnings process. Revision frequency is also positively associated with both firm-specific earnings response coefficients, proxying for the stock price response to new information. Tests also demonstrate that revision frequency is associated positively with prior average daily trading volume, as a measure of the variance of net order flow from liquidity trading.
Finally, revision frequency is associated negatively with the skewness of prior trading volume, which proxies for the number of informed investors who follow the firm. The tests of the model include controls 25 The results may also be affected by dependency in the data, as the sample includes multiple observations for the 727 firms included, and the use of year indicators will not completely control for this dependency.
for firm size and analyst following. Additional tests show that these associations hold when average daily stock price movement is included in regressions.
Appendix. = The number of analysts' forecast revisions issued between day +2 after earnings announcement and the subsequent earnings announcement by analysts who issued a revision during the 20 trading days following the announcement Following = The number of analysts providing at least one forecast of annual earnings before the beginning of the quarter Frequency = Revisions/Following Frequency2 = Revisions2/Following Size = Market value of equity at the beginning of the fiscal year Average Volume = Average daily trading volume over the year prior to the quarter's earn. announce. |Price Change| = The magnitude of the average daily stock price movement over the year prior to the earnings announcement Volatility = Squared residuals from the estimation of net income before extraordinary items as a random walk with trend Skew (Volume) = Skewness of daily trading volume of the year prior to the quarter's earn. announce. Frequency = The number of analysts' forecast revisions issued between day +2 after earnings announcement and the subsequent earnings announcement, scaled by analyst following Frequency2 = The number of analysts' forecast revisions issued between day +2 after earnings announcement and the subsequent earnings announcement by analysts who issued a revision during the 20 trading days following the announcement, scaled by analyst following Following = The number of analysts providing at least one forecast of annual earnings during the fiscal year of the announcement LnSize = The natural log of the market value of equity at the beginning of the fiscal year LnVolume = The natural log of the average daily trading volume over the year prior to the earnings announcement |Price Change| = The magnitude of the average daily stock price movement over the year prior to the earnings announcement LnERC = The natural log of the firm-specific ERC LnVolatility = The natural log of the squared residuals from the estimation of net income before extraordinary items as a random walk with trend, scaled by the absolute value of net income before extraordinary items Skew(Vol) = The skewness of average daily trading volume 
